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Abstract
Differences in individual wealth holdings are widely viewed as a driving force of
economic inequality. However, as this finding relies on cross-section data, a concern
is that one confuses older with wealthier. We propose a new method to adjust for age
effects in cross-sections, which eliminates wealth inequality due to age, yet preserves
inequality arising from other factors. Using a new cross-country comparable database,
we examine the impact of age adjustments on wealth inequality across countries and
over time. We find that the most widely used method yield a substantially different
picture of age adjusted wealth inequality than our method.
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1 Introduction
The distribution of wealth is an important determinant of overall economic inequality as
well as a marker for what types of activities that are rewarded in an economy. Wealth
inequality is also a matter of considerable interest in the literatures on economic growth,
institutions and development, occupational choice and entrepreneurship, as well as in asset
pricing.1 New sources of cross-country comparable microdata suggest that individuals’
wealth holdings vary substantially within and across countries. In most countries, the
Gini coefficient for wealth is reported to be twice that of income. Moreover, the world
distribution of wealth is found to be much more concentrated than the world distribution
of income.2
Because of data availability, however, this recent evidence on wealth inequality is based
on cross-sectional data. This is potentially problematic as both theoretical models and
empirical results suggest a strong age–wealth relationship (see e.g. Davies and Shorrocks,
2000). The age–wealth profile is firmly established as increasing during the working lifespan
and usually declining somewhat after retirement. Hence, a snapshot of wealth inequality
within a country runs the risk of confusing older with wealthier, and thereby providing a
misleading picture of the differences in the lifetime wealth of its citizens.
For this reason, it has long been argued that age adjustments of cross-sectional measures
of inequality are necessary (see e.g. Atkinson, 1971). Age adjustment allows us to utilize the
cross-sectional data at our disposal, while avoiding some of the potential pitfalls associated
with its use. In particular, age-adjusted inequality measures may be used to evaluate
whether changes in wealth inequality over time occur because of changes in the age structure
or whether there are other forces at play. Moreover, age adjustments can be useful when
comparing wealth inequality across countries, by controlling for differences resulting from
cross-country variation in age-wealth profiles and age structure.
In this paper, we investigate whether cross-sectional wealth inequality measures are sen-
1See e.g. Gollier (2001) for a study of wealth inequality and asset pricing; Mookherjee and Ray (2002) for
a review of the literature on wealth inequality and economic growth, institutions and development; and Meh
(2005) for a recent analysis of wealth inequality in relation to occupational choice and entrepreneurship.
2See e.g. Wolff (1996), Davies and Shorrocks (2000), Davies et al. (2006), and Sierminska et al. (2006).
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sitive to differences in wealth holdings over the life cycle, and how age adjustments may
influence the wealth inequality ranking of countries as well as the time trend in wealth
inequality in a country. In some respects, our approach goes back to Paglin’s (1975) pio-
neering paper which first raised the question of the age effect on inequality and its trend.
While the validity of the Paglin-Gini (PG) has been questioned from several perspectives,
which we address in our analysis, the issue of age adjustment of inequality measures remains
an important research question.3 In fact, given the aging of the large baby boom cohorts
born post World War II, the issue may be viewed as potentially more important now than
in the earlier period (1947-1972) considered by Paglin.
Our first contribution is that we propose a new method to adjust for age effects that,
unlike existing methods, addresses the fact that individuals differ both with respect to
age and with respect to other wealth generating factors. For example, an individual’s
education level is not only an important determinant of his wealth, but also correlated
with his age. Existing methods assume that the unconditional distribution of mean wealth
by age represents the age effects and will, therefore, not only eliminate wealth inequality
attributable to age but also differences because of factors correlated with age, such as
education. By contrast, the method proposed in this paper eliminates inequality because
of age, yet preserves inequality arising from other wealth generating factors. To this end, a
multivariate regression model is employed, allowing us to isolate the net age effects while
holding other determinants of wealth constant. Next, we derive a new, age-adjusted Gini
coefficient, where perfect equality requires that each individual receives a share of total
wealth equal to the proportion of wealth he would hold if all wealth generating factors
except age were the same for everyone in the society. Our method may be viewed as
a generalization of the approach to age adjustments proposed by Wertz (1979) and it is
important in situations where omitted variables bias is a major concern.4
3Paglin’s approach to age adjustment was subject to three rounds of comments and replies in the
American Economic Review (Paglin, 1977, 1979, 1989), has numerous citations, and continuous to be
subject to controversy.
4Even though Danziger et al. (1977), Minarik (1977), and Kurien (1977) in early comments to Paglin
(1975), point out that adjusting appropriately for age effects requires a well-specified multivariate model, we
are not aware of any study that adjusts for age effects while controlling for other determinants of individual
income or wealth holdings.
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Our second contribution is that we provide a theoretical foundation to assess the prop-
erties of age-adjusted inequality measures. In particular, we put forward a set of conditions
that are similar to those underlying the classical Gini coefficient in all respects but one: the
equalizing wealth is not given by the mean wealth in the society as a whole, but depends
on the age of the individuals. In the spirit of Paglin (1975), a no age-adjusted inequality in
a society requires that all individuals have equal lifetime wealth, but not that individuals
at all ages must have equal wealth holding in any given year. Furthermore, we explore the
relationship between our age-adjusted Gini coefficient, the classical Gini coefficient, and
alternative age-adjusted inequality measures.
Our final contribution is that we examine empirically the impact of age adjustments on
the wealth inequality ranking of countries as well as on the time trend for wealth inequality
in Italy and the United States. To this end, we use data from Canada, Finland, Germany,
Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, collected from the new, cross-
country comparable Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS) database. We find that the ranking
of wealth distributions are quite sensitive to the method used to make age adjustments. In
particular, the much-used PG is shown to yield a substantially different picture of wealth
inequality than our method. Interestingly, our new age-adjusted Gini coefficient provides
a wealth inequality ranking of countries that comes close to the ranking based on the
classical Gini coefficient, which disregards age effects. A possible interpretation is that
age adjustments might be less important than previous studies have suggested, albeit this
conclusion may not necessarily hold true for other applications.
This is the first study to examine the impact of age adjustments on the wealth inequality
ranking of countries. However, several studies have investigated the effect of adjusting for
age effects on wealth and income inequality in a given country. Paglin (1975) studied the
effect of age adjustment on the distribution of income and wealth in the United States.
He concluded that the classical Gini coefficient overstates wealth and income inequality
and, moreover, that age adjustments convert a flat time trend in income inequality into
a declining time profile. Formby et al. (1989) extend this work by analyzing the time
period 1980–1986. They found that inequality has risen faster according to PG than the
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classical Gini coefficient over this period.5 Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982) study income
inequality in the United Kingdom and find that adjusting for age converts an apparent
upward trend in overall income inequality into a declining time profile according to the
PG and horizontal when using strictly decomposable inequality measures to make age
adjustments. By contrast, Pudney (1993) suggests that only a small part of observed
income and wealth inequality in China can be explained by age effects. None of the above
studies use methods that adjust for age effects while controlling for other income or wealth
generating factors.
Section 2 sets out the proposed method to identify and adjust for age effects, and
explores its relationship to the classical Gini coefficient as well as to existing age-adjusted
inequality measures. Section 3 describes the data and clarifies definitional issues. Section
4 discusses the results using the different age-adjusted wealth inequality measures, before
Section 5 concludes.
2 Age adjustment of inequality
The proposed method for age adjustment of inequality may be described as a three-step
procedure. First, a new age-adjusted Gini coefficient (AG) is derived. Second, a multi-
variate regression model is employed, allowing us to isolate the net age effects on wealth
while holding other determinants of wealth constant. Third, the wealth distribution that
characterizes perfect equality in age-adjusted wealth is determined.
Below, we describe the three steps of our method, before examining the relationship
between AG, the classical Gini coefficient (G), and alternative age-adjusted inequality mea-
sures.
5Other studies that have attempted to adjust for age effects on income inequality estimates for the
United States include Danziger et al. (1977), Minarik (1977), Nelson (1977), and Friesen and Miller (1983).
For a review, see Formby et al. (1989).
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2.1 A new age-adjusted Gini coefficient
Consider a society consisting of n individuals where every individual i is characterized by
the pair (wi, w˜i), where wi denotes the actual wealth level and w˜i is the equalizing wealth
level in a given year. If actual and equalizing wealth are the same for all individuals and
they live equally long, there is perfect equality of lifetime wealth in this society. As will
be clear when we define the equalizing wealth level formally in Section 2.3, the equalizing
wealth is the same for all individuals belonging to the same age group in this society; it is
a function of individual i’s age, but not of any other individual characteristics. If no other
wealth-generating factor is correlated with age, the equalizing wealth is simply the mean
wealth of each age group. Furthermore, if there are no age effects on wealth, the equalizing
wealth will be equal to the mean wealth in the society as a whole.
The joint cross-sectional distribution Y of actual and equalizing wealth is given by
Y = [(w1, w˜1), (w2, w˜2), ..., (wn, w˜n)].
Let Ξ denote the set of all possible joint distributions of actual and equalizing wealth, such
that the sum of actual wealth equals the sum of equalizing wealth. Suppose that the social
planner imposes the following modified versions of the standard conditions on an inequality
partial ordering defined on the alternatives in Ξ, where A ¹ B represents that there is
at least as much age-adjusted inequality in B as in A.6 Let µ denote the mean wealth of
the population as a whole, and ∆i represent the difference between individual i’s actual
wealth wi and equalizing wealth w˜i. Let the distributions of such differences for the two
distributions (∆i(A) = wi(A)− w˜i(A) and ∆i(B) = wi(B)− w˜i(B)) be sorted in ascending
order.
Condition 1. Scale Invariance: For any a > 0 and A,B ∈ Ξ, if A = aB, then A ∼ B.
Condition 2. Anonymity: For any permutation function ρ : n→ n and for A,B ∈ Ξ, if
(wi(A), w˜i(A)) = (wρ(i)(B), w˜ρ(i)(B)) for all i ∈ n then A ∼ B.
Condition 3. Unequalism: For any A,B ∈ Ξ such that µ(A) = µ(B), if ∆i(A) = ∆i(B)
for every i ∈ n, then A ∼ B.
6See Alma˚s et al. (2007) for analogous conditions imposed to study equality of opportunity.
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Condition 4. Generalized Pigou–Dalton: For any A,B ∈ Ξ, if there exist two in-
dividuals s and k such that ∆s(A) < ∆s(B) ≤ ∆k(B) < ∆k(A), ∆i(A) = ∆i(B) for all
i 6= s, k, and ∆s(B)−∆s(A) = ∆k(A)−∆k(B), then A Â B.
Scale invariance states that, if all actual and equalizing wealth levels are rescaled by the
same factor, then the level of age-adjusted inequality remains the same. Anonymity im-
plies that the ranking of alternatives should be unaffected by a permutation of the identity
of individuals. Unequalism entails that the social planner is only concerned with how
unequally each individual is treated, defined as the difference between his actual and equal-
izing wealth.7 Finally, the generalized version of the Pigou–Dalton criterion states that any
fixed transfer of wealth from an individual i to an individual j, where ∆i > ∆j, reduces
age-adjusted inequality.
AG is based on a comparison of the absolute values of the differences in actual and
equalizing wealth between all pairs of individuals, and is defined as
AG =
∑
j
∑
i |(wi − w˜i)− (wj − w˜j)|
2µn2
. (1)
It is straightforward to see that AG satisfies Conditions 1–4. Note that these conditions
are similar to those underlying G in all respects but one: the equalizing wealth is not given
by the mean wealth in the society as a whole, but depends on the age of the individuals.
Because it is straightforward to construct age-adjusted Lorenz curves based on the
distribution of differences between actual and equalizing wealth, it is by no means necessary
to focus on the Gini coefficient: other inequality indices that are based on the Lorenz curve,
such as the Bonferroni index, can also form the basis for age adjustments.
2.2 Identifying the net age effects
Suppose that the wealth level of individual i at a given point in time, depends on the age
group a that he belongs to as well as his lifetime resources given as a function h of a vector
X of individual characteristics
7This condition may therefore be viewed as analogous to the Focus axiom in poverty analysis, stating
that a poverty index should focus entirely on the incomes of the poor. See e.g. Foster and Shorrocks (1991).
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wi = f(ai)h(Xi). (2)
The functional form of f depends on the underlying model of wealth accumulation. In
the simplest life cycle model, there is no uncertainty, individuals earn a constant income
until retirement, and the interest rate as well as the rate of time preference is zero. In this
model, the wealth of an individual increases up to retirement and declines afterwards. If
the earnings profile is upward sloping, the model predicts borrowing in the early part of the
life cycle. The fact that this is not always observed could be explained by credit market
imperfections. Introducing lifetime uncertainty and noninsurable health hazards induce the
elderly to hold assets for precautionary purposes, which reduces the rate at which wealth
declines during retirement. If the sole purpose of saving is to leave a bequest to one’s
children, individuals behave as if their horizons were infinite and wealth does not decline
with age.
Given the theoretical ambiguity of f , we specify a flexible functional form, yielding the
wealth generating function
lnwi = ln f(ai) + lnh(Xi) = δi +X
′
iB, (3)
where δi gives the percentage wealth difference of being in the age group of individual
i relative to some reference age group, holding all other variables constant. Because of
the right skewness combined with the sparse tail of the wealth distribution, our log-linear
specification is preferable to a linear specification. As net wealth may be negative, we
therefore add to each wealth observation a constant equal to the absolute value of the
minimum wealth observation when estimating the log-linear specification. This is simply
a matter of adjusting the location of the distribution.8 Equation (3) is estimated by OLS
separately for each country. The key assumption underlying this estimation is that there
are no omitted factors correlated with age that determine individual wealth holding. In
8In this regard, it should be noted that the properties of inequality measures based on the Gini coefficient
are preserved when applied to distributions with zero and negative values (see e.g. Amiel et al., 1996).
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that case, we obtain consistent estimates of the net age effects on wealth.
It is important to emphasize that the objective of the estimation of equation (3) is not
to explain as much variation as possible in wealth holdings, but simply to get an empirically
sound estimate of the effects of age on wealth. Drawing on the findings of Jappelli (1999)
and Hendricks (2007) of individual characteristics correlated with wealth, X includes ed-
ucational attainment in our baseline specification. When performing robustness analysis,
we extend the set of controls to include sex, number of children, industry and occupation
of household head, region of residence, marital status, immigration status, and spouse’s
characteristics. The reasons for not including these variables in the baseline specification
are twofold. First, we do not have data on all the variables for every country under study.
In addition, some of the variables are potentially endogenous to individuals’ wealth holding.
In any case, we show that our results are robust to the inclusion of the additional controls.
Existing age-adjusted inequality measures, discussed in detail in Section 2.5, implicitly
assume a stationary economy, implying no cohort effects. Consequently, they risk confound-
ing age effects with cohort effects, as these factors are perfectly collinear in a cross-section.
A novelty of this paper is that we make an effort to separate age effects from cohort effects.
As pointed out by Heckman and Robb (1985), it is necessary to impose some structure
on the cohort effects in order to address this identification problem. Jappelli (1999) and
Kapteyn et al. (2005) explore reasons why different cohorts accumulate different amounts
of wealth. They found that productivity growth is the primary determinant of differences
in wealth across cohorts; productivity growth generates differences in permanent incomes
across cohorts, which feeds into the wealth accumulation of individuals belonging to dif-
ferent generations. Following Masson (1986), we assume that the age cross-sections and
the cohort profiles of wealth (in constant prices) coincide except for a constant state of
real growth. If wealth grows at the rate g, then the typical profile for any given cohort is
(1+ g) times larger than that for the one-year-older cohort. When estimating equation (3),
we therefore inflate each individual’s wealth value by the factor (1 + g)age. Mirer (1979)
shows that under commonly accepted assumptions in life cycle theory, the growth rate of
wealth is equal to the growth rate of income between successive cohorts. To adjust the
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observed wealth levels for economic growth across cohorts, we use an annual growth rate
of 2.5 percent. Our results are robust to other choices of growth rates.
The assumption of a stationary economy also implies no intra-cohort mobility in indi-
vidual wealth holdings, which has been criticized by e.g. Johnson (1977) and Friesen and
Miller (1983). By conditioning on individual characteristics, the assumption of parallel
age–wealth profiles may be more reasonable for AG than for existing age-adjusted inequal-
ity measures. However, just as any other study measuring inequality using cross-sectional
data, this paper admittedly comes short of fully accounting for the effects of intracohort
mobility. Yet, it is reassuring that several studies suggest that accounting for mobility has
little impact on country rankings by income inequality (see e.g. Burkhauser and Poupore,
1997; Aaberge et al., 2002).
2.3 Defining equalizing wealth
Identifying the net age effect is only part of the job; we also need to find a consistent
way of adjusting for age effects when there are other wealth generating factors. There is
a considerable literature concerning the problem of how to adjust for some, but not all,
income generating factors when the income function is not additively separable (see e.g.
Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) and Kolm (1996)). The problem of adjusting for age effects
on wealth is analogous. To eliminate wealth differences attributable to age but preserve
inequality arising from all other factors, we employ the so-called general proportionality
principle proposed by Bossert (1995) and Konow (1996), and further studied in Cappelen
and Tungodden (2007). Then, the absence of age-adjusted inequality requires that any two
individuals belonging to a given age group have the same wealth level. Moreover, in any
situation where everyone has the same wealth generating factors except age, there should
be no lifetime wealth inequality.
Specifically, the equalizing wealth level of individual i depends on his age as well as
every other wealth generating factor of all individuals in the society, and is formally defined
as
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w˜i =
µn
∑
j f(ai)h(Xj)∑
k
∑
j f(ak)h(Xj)
=
µneδi∑
k e
δk
, (4)
where eδk gives the net age effect of belonging to the age group of individual k after integrat-
ing out the effects of other wealth generating factors correlated with age. No age-adjusted
inequality corresponds to every individual i receiving w˜i, which is the share of total wealth
equal to the proportion of wealth an individual from his age group would hold if all wealth
generating factors except age were the same for everyone in the population. If there is no
age effect on wealth, the equalizing wealth level is equal to the mean wealth level in the
society.
2.4 Relationship to the classical Gini coefficient
The classical Gini coefficient is defined in equation (5). By comparing this expression to
equation (1), we can see there is a very close link between G and AG. Both measures are
based on a comparison of the absolute values of the differences in actual and equalizing
wealth levels between all pairs of individuals. The distinguishing feature is how equalizing
wealth is defined. For G, the equalizing wealth level is assumed to be µ: perfect equality
requires not only equal lifetime wealth, but additionally that individuals of all ages must
have the same wealth holding in any given year, which can be realized only if there is a flat
age–wealth profile.
G(Y ) =
∑
j
∑
i |(wi − µ)− (wj − µ)|
2µn2
, (5)
However, a flat age–wealth profile runs counter to both consumption needs over the life
cycle and productivity variation depending on human capital investment and experience.
Indeed, the relationship between wealth and age can produce wealth inequality at a given
point in time even if everyone is completely equal in all respects but age. As transitory
wealth differences even out over time, a snapshot of inequality produced by G runs the risk
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Figure 1: Standard and difference based representations of the classical Lorenz
curve.
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of producing a misleading picture of actual variation in lifetime wealth. In comparison,
AG abandons the assumption of a flat age-wealth profile and allows equalizing wealth to
depend on the age of the individuals. In doing so, AG purges the cross-sectional measure
of inequality of its inter-age or life cycle component. If w˜i = µ for all individuals in every
age group, the age–wealth profile is flat and AG coincides with G.
To get further intuition on the similarities and differences between G and AG, it is
helpful to see the correspondence between the standard representation of the Lorenz curve
and a Lorenz curve expressed in differences between actual wealth and mean wealth in the
society as a whole. Figure 1 displays standard and difference based Lorenz curves for the
same wealth distribution. The area between the standard Lorenz curve and the diagonal of
the upper diagram (the line of equality) is identical to the area between the difference based
Lorenz curve and the horizontal axis (the line of equality) in the lower diagram. In both
cases, G is equal to twice the area A, between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality.
In a similar way, we can draw the age-adjusted Lorenz curve underlying AG, expressing
the differences between actual wealth and the equalizing wealth in the population. And
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just as for G, AG is equal to twice the area between this difference based Lorenz curve and
the horizontal axis (line of equality). When drawing age-adjusted Lorenz curves, however,
individuals are ordered not by their wealth per se, as in Figure 1, but according to the
difference between actual and equalizing wealth.
Both G and AG reach their minimum value of 0, if everyone receives their equalizing
wealth. Moreover, both measures take their maximum when the difference between actual
and equalizing wealth is at its highest possible level. Specifically, G reaches its maximum
value of 1, if one individual holds all wealth. In comparison, AG takes its maximum of
2 in the hypothetical situation where the equalizing wealth of the individual who has all
the wealth is zero, and the equalizing wealth of one of the individuals with no wealth is
equal to the aggregate wealth in the economy. The fact that AG and G range over different
intervals is therefore a direct result of their different views of perfect equality: Age-adjusted
inequality is not only a result of differences in individuals’ actual wealth holding, but also
a result of differences in equalizing wealth between individuals at different points in the life
cycle.
By the same token, AG will be smaller (greater) than G whenever the differences in
individuals’ wealth holding because of age is positively (negatively) correlated with differ-
ences in individuals’ wealth attributable to other wealth generating factors.9 For example,
an individual with zero wealth will contribute less to inequality in AG than in G whenever
his equalizing wealth level is lower than the mean wealth in the society.
2.5 Relationship to existing age-adjusted inequality measures
There are two distinguishing aspects of age-adjusted inequality measures. First, they hold
different views on how equalizing wealth should be measured. Second, they differ in the
way they aggregate up the differences between actual and equalizing wealth. In this paper,
we consider two alternative age-adjusted inequality measures: PG and the Wertz’ Gini
(WG). They both have the same objective as AG, namely to purge G applied to snapshots
9To see this, let ²i = wi− w˜i for any individual i, and note that AG and G have the same denominator.
While the numerator of AG aggregates |²i− ²j | over all pairs of individuals, the numerator of G aggregates
|(w˜i + ²i)− (w˜i + ²j)| of all pairs of individuals. Hence, G > AG whenever cov(w˜, ² > 0).
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of wealth inequality of its inter-age or life cycle component. In particular, the condition of
a flat age-wealth profile is relaxed. Below, we use Conditions 1–4 to assess the properties
of PG and WG, and to characterize their relationship to AG.
Because of its close relationship to AG, it is convenient to first consider WG, which was
proposed by Wertz (1979). He claims that PG fails to adjust properly for age effects, but
his comment has been largely ignored, perhaps because Wertz does not put up conditions
that allow a formal assessment of the properties of PG and WG. Let WG be defined by
WG(Y ) =
∑
j
∑
i |(wi − µi)− (wj − µj)|
2µn2
, (6)
where µi and µj denote the mean wealth level of all individuals belonging to the age
group of individual i and j, respectively. Like AG, WG is based on a comparison of the
absolute values of the differences in actual and equalizing wealth levels between all pairs
of individuals and ranges over the interval [0, 2]. It is also straightforward to see that it
satisfies Conditions 1–4.
The distinguishing feature between AG and WG is that the latter measure defines the
equalizing wealth of an individual i as the unconditional mean wealth levels in his age
group, µi, whereas the former measure defines his equalizing wealth as the net age effect
of belonging to his age group after integrating out the effects of other wealth generating
factors correlated with age, w˜i. Any differences between AG and WG is therefore a result
of omitted variables bias in using µi to measure equalizing wealth. As is well known, the
omitted variables bias in µi is given by the effect of the omitted variables on wealth times the
regression of omitted variables on age (see e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2009). For example,
an individual’s birth cohort is perfectly collinear with his age and will therefore bias the
age effects insofar as it is correlated with wealth. Another example is education, which is
correlated with both age and wealth. The omitted variables bias formula tells us that WG
will be equal to AG whenever age is uncorrelated with omitted wealth generating factors.
Hence, AG may be viewed as a generalization of WG, and is important in situations where
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omitted variables bias is a major concern.
Next, consider the much used PG, which can be expressed as
PG(Y ) =
∑
j
∑
i(|wi − wj| − |µi − µj|)
2µn2
, (7)
where µi and µj denote the mean wealth level of all individuals belonging to the age group
of individuals i and j, respectively. Applying the standard Gini decomposition, PG can be
rewritten as
PG = G−Gb =
∑
i
θiGi +R, (8)
where Gb represents the Gini coefficient that would be obtained if the wealth of each
individual in every age group were replaced by the relevant age group mean µi, Gi represents
the Gini coefficient of wealth within the age group of individual i, θi is the weight given by
the product of this group’s wealth share niµi
µn
and population share ni
n
(ni is the number of
individuals in the age group of individual i), and R captures the degree of overlap in the
wealth distributions across age groups (see e.g. Lambert and Aronson, 1993).10
Both WG and PG defines the equalizing wealth of an individual as the mean wealth
level of the age groups he belongs to, disregarding that other wealth generating factors are
correlated with age. Unlike AG, they may not only eliminate inequality due to age but also
inequality because of these other factors.
In addition, PG stands out in the way it aggregates up the differences in actual and
equalizing wealth. Specifically, PG is based on a comparison of differences in the absolute
values of actual and equalizing wealth levels between all pairs of individuals, |(wi − wj)| −
|(µi−µj)|. This runs counter to the Unequalism condition, because |(wi−wj)|−|(µi−µj)| =
0 does not necessarily imply that |(wi − µi)− (wj − µj)| = 0. The following numerical ex-
10Overlap implies that the wealth holding of the richest person in an age group with a relatively low
mean wealth level exceeds the wealth holding of the poorest person in an age group with a higher mean
wealth level, that is, wi < wj and µi > µj for at least one pair of individuals i and j.
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ample shows that PG violates this condition. Consider two countries A and B with two
age groups, each consisting of two individuals. Suppose that country A′s distribution of
actual and equalizing wealth, (wi(A), µi(A)), is given by
A = [(20, 60), (100, 60), (60, 80), (100, 80)],
whereas country B′s distribution of (wi(B), µi(B)) is given by
B = [(0, 40), (80, 40), (80, 100), (120, 100)].
In both countries, the distribution of differences between the actual and equalizing wealth,
wi − µi, is given by [{−40, 40}, {−20, 20}]. According to the Unequalism condition, age-
adjusted inequality measures should be the same when the distributions of differences be-
tween actual and equalizing wealth are the same. While WG satisfies this condition, PG
violates it.11
Arguably, the Unequalism condition is an intuitively appealing condition as it ensures
that age-adjusted inequality measures follow G in measuring inequality according to the
differences in actual and equalizing wealth, between all pairs of individuals, rather than
the aggregated differences in actual wealth minus the aggregated differences in equalizing
wealth.12
As |(wi−wj)− (µi−µj)| provides an upper bound for |(wi−wj)|− |(µi−µj)|, it follows
that WG ≥ PG. This begs the question: under which conditions will WG be equal to
PG, and subsequently, can we be sure that the two measures produce the same inequality
ranking? As stated in Proposition 1, PG will differ from WG if there is any age effect on
wealth, provided that there is some within age group wealth variation.
11Specifically, WG(A) =WG(B) = 0.25, whereas PG(A) = 0.179 6= PG(B) = 0.107.
12Our numerical example illustrates the difference. Consider distribution A and the contribution to
age-adjusted inequality from the comparison of the richest individuals in the two age-groups, for which
(wi(A), µi(A)) is given by (100, 60) and (100, 80). Paglin advocates that perfect equality corresponds to
everyone receiving the mean wealth of their age-group. A wealth comparison of this pair of individuals
should thus contribute with 20 to age-adjusted inequality, which is captured by the numerator of WG. By
contrast, the numerator of PG records a −20 contribution to age-adjusted inequality – the rationale for
which is hard to grasp.
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Proposition 1. For any distribution Y ,WG(Y ) ≥ PG(Y ), with strong inequality whenever
µi 6= µj for at least one pair of individuals and wi 6= µi or wj 6= µj for at least one of these
individuals.
(The proof is provided in Appendix A.)
As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, overlap in the wealth distributions across age-
groups, that is, R > 0, is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for WG > PG.
A corollary to Proposition 1 is therefore that PG is likely to yield a different ranking
than WG in situations where countries differ substantially in the degree of overlap. This
result relates to a major controversy surrounding PG, namely whether or not R should
be treated as an inter-age or a within age-groups component.13 Until recently, the issue
was unsettled simply because little was known about the overlap term; Shorrocks and Wan
(2005), for example, refer to R as a “poorly specifie” element of the Gini decomposition.
However, Lambert and Decoster (2005) provide a novel characterization of the properties
of R, showing first that R unambiguously falls as a result of a within-group progressive
transfer, and second that R increases when the wealth holding in the poorer group is scaled
up, and reaches a maximum when means coincide. This makes Lambert and Decoster (2005,
p. 378) conclude that “The overlap term in R is at once a between-groups and a within-
groups effect: it measures a between-groups phenomenon, overlapping, that is generated
by inequality within groups”. Therefore, R = 0 is necessary (although not sufficient) for
PG to net out the inter-age component, and nothing but the inter-age component, from
cross-sectional inequality measures.
3 Data and definitions
Recently, the availability and quality of data on household wealth has improved. House-
hold surveys of assets and debt have previously suffered from nonsampling errors because
of high nonresponse and misreporting rates. In addition, comparative studies of wealth
13Nelson (1977) and others argue that R is part of inter-age inequality and should thus be netted out
when constructing age-adjusted inequality measures. Paglin (1977), however, maintains that R is capturing
within-group inequality and that PG is accurately defined.
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distributions have been haunted by comparability problems because of methodological and
data issues ranging from the basic problem of index numbers to differences in the methods
and definitions used in the various countries. Today, the data problems are mitigated by
oversampling of wealthy people in surveys as well as by utilizing supplementary informa-
tion such as administrative data from tax and estate registers. The LWS—an international
project to collect and harmonize existing microdata on household wealth into a coherent
database—has reduced the comparability problems. We use the LWS database, and select
the following seven countries because of data availability: Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.14
It should be noted that we follow previous studies of wealth distributions using the LWS
database in excluding Austria, Norway and Cyprus from the analysis (see e.g. Sierminska,
2006). We drop Norway because of the inconsistency stemming from valuing real estate
on a taxable basis and debt at market prices,15 Cyprus because over 60 percent of the
observations lack information on net wealth, and Austria because it lacks data on net
wealth. Finland’s 1994 survey is also excluded because this data set lacks information on
education.
We follow common practice and focus on the distribution of household net wealth,
which refers to material assets that can be sold in the marketplace less any debts, thereby
excluding pension rights as well as human capital. Net wealth consists of financial assets and
nonfinancial assets net of total debt. Total debts refer to all outstanding loans. Financial
assets include deposit accounts, stocks, and mutual funds, whilst nonfinancial assets consist
of the principal residence and other real estate investments.16 Business assets are not
included.
14See Sierminska et al. (2006) and the LWS homepage http://www.lisproject.org/lwstechdoc.htm for a
detailed description of the LWS database.
15Statistics Norway estimates that in the 1990s the taxable value of houses was, on average, less than a
third of their market values (see Harding et al., 2004). The majority of Norwegians are therefore registered
with negative net wealth.
16The self-assessed current value of the principal residence and other real estate investments is reported
for all countries except for Sweden, where the tax value is reported. However, Statistics Sweden calculates
the ratios of purchase prices to tax values for different types of houses and geographical location, and uses
them to inflate the tax values. For comparability issues it is also comforting that the principal residence
represents almost the same share of total assets in Sweden as in neighboring country Finland (61 vs. 64
percent).
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This paper uses the household as the economic unit. This is in part because assets are
recorded at the household level but also to conform to previous studies of wealth distri-
butions. Households with missing values for wealth, education, or age of household head
are dropped. To compare the wealth holdings of singles and couples, we assign each mar-
ried/cohabiting spouse a wealth level equal to his or her net household wealth divided by
the square root of two. Robustness analysis demonstrates that our results are unaffected
by the choice of equivalence scale.
To define age groups, we follow common practice and rely on information about the
age of the household head. To be specific, we define seven age groups: 24 years and
younger, 25–34 years, 35–44 years, 45–54 years, 55–64 years, 65–74 years, and 75 years
and older.17 There are no household heads older than 75 years in the Swedish data. In
all countries, we categorize the education variable into four educational groups. The four
groups correspond as close as possible to the following categories: ’High school dropout’,
’High school graduate’, ’Non-university post-secondary certificate’, and ’University degree
or certificate’.
In the robustness analysis, we run a battery of specification checks, adding further
controls to equation (3), including number of children, marital status, region of residence,
immigrant status, as well as sex, occupation, and industry of household head. Marital
status is divided into five categories: ’single without children’, ’single with children’, ’couple
without children’, ’couple with children’, and ’others’. Industry and occupation are included
using the countries’ own categories.
17Formby et al. (1989) and Paglin (1989) discuss the theoretical effects of the choice of the widths of the
age groups on age adjustments of inequality. The results of Formby et al. (1989) suggest, however, that
age-adjusted inequality estimates are not substantially different for age groups of one, five, and 10 year
intervals.
19
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Overall, the descriptive statistics are consistent with previous evidence in showing substan-
tial variation among OECD countries in the age structure (Burkhauser et al., 1997; Banks
et al., 2003) as well as savings patterns (Borsch-Supan, 2003).18
Table 1 demonstrates that there is considerable variation in the demographic structure
of the six OECD countries examined in this study. First and foremost, the age structure
differs substantially across the countries. For instance, Italy has on average older household
heads, which may be because Italians move out from their parents’ house later in life than
what is typical in most OECD countries (see e.g. Manacorda and Moretti, 2006). By
contrast, Canada as well as the Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland, have relatively
young household heads. The fact that the age structure differs means that the inequality
ranking of countries may be affected by age adjustments, even if countries have the same
age–wealth profile.
Table 1 also reveals a considerable change over time in the age structure in the United
States. As a results of the large, but temporary, increase in the population growth rate
following World War II, the population shares of middle-aged and older household heads
have increased significantly from 2000 to 2006. Because the middle-aged and elderly have,
on average, accumulated more wealth than the young, changes in age composition may
potentially affect the trend in inequality.
Furthermore, Table 1 demonstrates significant cross-country differences in educational
attainment. In particular, the educational level is substantially lower in Italy compared
with the United States and Germany. The United States also stands out with the highest
mean wealth, whereas Canada and the Nordic countries have the lowest. This may come as
no surprise given the differences in the scope of the public savings programs between these
countries (see e.g. Klevmarken et al., 2003).
Figure 2 reveals that there is not only a considerable variation in the age structure
18See Sierminska et al. (2006) for detailed discussion of the descriptive statistics of the LWS database.
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across the countries, but also a substantial variation in the age–wealth relationship. This
indicates that cross-country comparisons of inequality could potentially be affected by age
effects. In particular, the United States has a markedly more hump-shaped age–wealth
profile than the rest of the countries. In contrast, there seems to be relatively little life
cycle savings in Sweden, which corresponds to what is found Klevmarken (2006).
4.2 Estimation results
Equation (3) is estimated separately by OLS for each country, and separately for each cross
section for the United States and Italy, for which we have data for more than one year.
The fairly precise estimation results presented in Table 2 reveal a standard hump-shaped
age–wealth profile where wealth increases during the working lifespan and declines some-
what after retirement in most countries. Wealth generally increases with education; the
increase is, however, larger in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Italy, than in the other
countries.
It is also evident from Table 2 that the explanatory power differs substantially across
the countries. Canada and Italy have higher R-squared than the other countries, whereas
Sweden has by far the lowest R-squared, mirroring the cross-country differences in life cycle
saving. As emphasized in Section 2.2, the main purpose of these regressions is not to explain
as much of the wealth generating process as possible, but rather to back out an empirically
sound estimate of the net age effect. Hence, variation in goodness of fit measures across
countries is a concern insofar as it reflects cross-country differences in omitted variables
bias, rather than differences in unobservables unrelated to age. Below, we report results
from a battery of robustness checks addressing the concern for omitted variables bias, none
of which changes the results of the analysis.
4.3 Age-adjusted estimates of wealth inequality
This section investigates how age adjustments may influence the wealth inequality ranking
of countries as well as the time trend in wealth inequality within a country. But first, it
should be noted that the age-adjusted inequality measures, like G, are ordinal in nature and
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any monotonic transformation of such a measure will preserve its ranking of distributions.
This means that the numerical values of these inequality measures are primarily of interest
as a way of comparing and ordering the distributions. The fact that the measures range
over different intervals is therefore beside the point.19
The first row of Table 3 reports wealth inequality results using the G for the seven coun-
tries under study. We can see that the reported G for wealth is substantially larger than
that for income.20 It is also evident that Italy has the least unequal wealth distribution fol-
lowed by Finland, whereas the United States and Sweden have the strongest concentration
of wealth among its citizens. Figure 3 shows the time trend in wealth inequality for Italy
and the United States. We can see that G suggests a slight decrease in inequality in both
countries.
The low wealth inequality in Finland corresponds well to its low income inequality. In
comparison, the high wealth inequality in Sweden contrasts with its low income inequality,
but conforms to findings from other studies (see e.g. Sierminska et al., 2006, Domeij and
Klein, 2002). This is, to a large extent, driven by the large fraction of households with
zero or negative net wealth in Sweden compared with other countries. Domeij and Klein
(2002) suggest that Sweden’s redistributive public pension scheme can account for much
of the difference between the degree of inequality in its income and its wealth distribution.
However, it is not clear that the public pension scheme explanation is consistent with the
evidence that Finland and Sweden have quite similar income inequality but widely different
wealth inequality. An alternative explanation for the high wealth concentration in Sweden
is that it was not affected by the main economic and geopolitical shocks that have been
identified as major causes of decreased top wealth shares in other developed countries:
Sweden did not participate in either of the world wars and was little affected by the Great
Depression (Roine and Waldenstrom, 2009).
Rows 2–5 of Table 3 report age-adjusted inequality measures for the seven countries
19As shown in Section 2.4, G can range from 0 to 1, PG from 0 to G, and AG and WG from 0 to 2.
Normalizing these measures so that they range over the same interval is possible, but it will not affect the
ranking of the wealth distributions for any of the measures.
20G for income for the seven countries under study is reported to be as follows: Canada 0.33 (2000),
Finland 0.27 (2000), Germany 0.28 (2000), Italy 0.36 (2000), Sweden 0.25 (2000), the United Kingdom 0.36
(1999), and the United States 0.41 (2001) (WDI; 2010).
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Table 3: Wealth inequality ranking of countries according to different measures
Canada -99 Germany -01 Italy -02 Sweden -02 UK -00 USA -00 Finland -98
G 0.752 (4/5) 0.752 (4/5) 0.576 (1) 0.880 (6) 0.694 (3) 0.914 (7) 0.584 (2)
PG 0.446 (3) 0.500 (5) 0.476 (4) 0.612 (7) 0.428 (2) 0.528 (6) 0.380 (1)
WG 0.760 (5) 0.754 (4) 0.572 (2) 0.862 (6) 0.678 (3) 1.080 (7) 0.548 (1)
AGnocontrols 0.728 (4) 0.749 (5) 0.576 (2) 0.878 (6) 0.681 (3) 0.912 (7) 0.572 (1)
AG 0.730 (4) 0.750 (5) 0.587 (2) 0.878 (6) 0.680 (3) 0.912 (7) 0.572 (1)
Note: Data sources are national household wealth surveys included and harmonized in the
LWS database. Household weights are used to ensure nationally representative results.
Country ranking is given in parentheses.
Figure 3: Time trend in wealth inequality, United States and Italy
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under study, while Figure 3 shows the time trends in age-adjusted wealth inequality for
Italy and the United States. The insights from these results may be summarized in three
conclusions. First, the country ranking of wealth distributions and the time trends in wealth
inequality are quite sensitive to the method used to make age adjustments. In particular, the
much used PG is shown to yield a substantially different picture of wealth inequality than
AG and WG. Second, AG produces a wealth inequality ranking of countries that comes
close to the ranking based on WG, albeit the wealth inequality time trend for the United
States differs substantially when using AG compared with WG. Nevertheless, the way age-
adjusted inequality measures aggregate up the difference between actual and equalizing
wealth seems to play a larger role than omitted variables bias, as the inequality rankings
differ more between WG and PG than between AG and WG. Third, AG produces a very
similar ranking as G. Although this may be reassuring for statistical offices and government
agencies, which regularly rely on G to evaluate cross-sectional wealth distributions, this
conclusion may not necessarily hold true for other applications.21
Turning to a more detailed investigation of the empirical results using the different
measures, let us first consider the results using PG, reported in the second row of Table 3.
We can see that PG yields a very different picture of wealth inequality than G. For example,
according to PG the wealth inequality in Sweden is higher than that in the United States,
a result that runs counter to findings from other age-adjusted inequality measures as well
as G. Moreover, PG alters the ranking of Italy from having clearly the most equal wealth
distribution to being more unequal than Finland, the United Kingdom, and Canada. It is
also evident that Canada and Germany change order in the country ranking when using
PG. In addition, Figure 3 reveals that PG produces a different time trend of wealth
inequality in the United States, compared with G. Overall, our findings for PG conform
well to Paglin’s (1975) study of income and wealth inequality in the United States over the
period 1947-1972, in suggesting that age adjustments change the picture of inequality.
21For example, Alma˚s et al. (2010) use the method proposed in this paper to study the time trend
in earnings inequality in Norway over the last few decades. They find that G and AG yield substantially
different time trends in earnings in Norway. Furthermore, the time trend in AG andWG differ substantially.
A possible explanation is that the correlation between education and earnings is in fact much stronger than
the correlation between education and wealth.
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As shown in equation (8), PG may yield a different wealth inequality ranking than
G insofar as there is significant cross-country variation in between-group inequality, Gb.
Because Gb is a population share weighted average of the different age-group means, it
increases as a result of larger disparity in mean wealth across age groups. For example,
Figure 3 shows that the United States has a much stronger age–wealth relationship than
Sweden, which explains why PG alters the ranking of the two countries. Furthermore, Gb
increases with the number of people in the age groups with relatively low and relatively
high mean wealth levels. For instance, Italy has a relatively compressed age distribution
compared with Canada, which explains the change in the country ranking when measuring
inequality using PG instead of G. In comparison, Canada and the United Kingdom experi-
ence a similar decrease from G and PG because their age–wealth profiles and age structure
are quite similar.22
Next, consider the results using WG, reported in the third row of Table 3 and Figure 3.
We can see immediately that the country ranking of wealth distributions and the time
trends in wealth inequality are quite sensitive to the way age-adjusted inequality measures
aggregate up the differences between individuals’ actual and equalizing wealth. In line
with Proposition 1, WG is greater than PG for all countries. This is, in part, because
of considerable overlap in the wealth distributions across age groups. Indeed, the overlap
term R, defined in equation (7), ranges between 0.196 (Finland, 1998) and 0.355 (United
States, 2000) in the countries under study. This cross-country variation in the degree of
overlap also contributes to explaining the large change in the wealth inequality ranking of
countries. For example, WG evaluates Germany as more equal than Canada, whereas PG
evaluates Canada as more equal than Germany. At the same time, R is considerably larger
in Canada (0.260) than in Germany (0.232).
The two last rows, report the inequality rankings based on AG. Specifically, the last row
uses the estimated age effects reported in Table 2 to compute the equalizing wealth levels
defined by equation (4) and the associated AG given by equation (1). In comparison, the
22Specifically, Gb for the different countries are as follows: 0.306 (Canada 1999), 0.251 (Germany 2001),
0.102 (Italy 2002), 0.110 (Italy 2004), 0.269 (Sweden 2002), 0.268 (United Kingdom 2000), 0.386 (United
States 2000), 0.466 (United States 2003), 0.443 (United States 2006), and 0.204 (Finland 1998).
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fourth row drops the controls for education in equation (3), so that the only distinguishing
feature fromWG is the adjustment for economic growth across cohorts in the identification
of age-group mean wealth levels. Any difference between WG and AG without controls is
therefore attributable to omitted variables bias in the former measure because of cohort
effects, whereas the difference between AG without controls and AG with controls is a
result of omitted variables bias in the former measure because of education.
We can see that the country rankings according to AG without controls are quite similar
to those of WG. The exception is the rankings of Canada and Germany. In addition,
Figure 3 reveals thatWG suggests a rise in wealth inequality in the United States from 2000
to 2002, whereas AG without controls indicates a small decline. When comparing the last
two rows, it is clear that AG with and without controls produces the same picture of wealth
inequality. In fact, the point estimates are very similar. This implies that education is not
an important source of omitted variables bias in age-adjusted inequality. To understand
why, recall that the omitted variables bias depends on the effect of the omitted variables
on wealth times the regression of omitted variables on age. Table 2 shows that wealth
generally increases with education. Furthermore, when regressing age on education we
find that younger cohorts have a higher level of education than older cohorts.23 However,
the magnitude of these effects is too small to change the wealth inequality ranking. The
relatively small omitted variables bias is mirrored in Table 4, showing that the estimated
age effects on wealth without controls for education are quite similar to those with controls
for education, reported in Table 2. We also see that the omitted variable bias is strongest
in Italy, because of the relatively strong effects of education on wealth and age on education
in that country.
Finally, it should be noted that the country ranking according to AG is quite similar
to that produced by G. The exceptions are that the age adjustment makes Finland more
equal than Italy and Canada more equal than Germany. As discussed in Section 2, AG
will be smaller (greater) than G whenever the differences in individuals’ wealth holding
because of age is positively (negatively) correlated with differences in individuals’ wealth
23The regressions results of age on education are reported in Appendix C.
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holding attributable to other wealth generating factors. The fact that the estimates of G
and AG are generally quite similar therefore implies that the correlation is fairly small.
This suggests that individuals who have relatively high equalizing wealth because of the
age group they belong to do not have systematically different wealth holdings because of
other wealth generating factors.
4.4 Robustness analysis of the age-adjusted inequality measure
We run a battery of robustness checks to examine whether the results from our age-adjusted
inequality measure are sensitive to the inclusion of additional controls, choice of growth
adjustment, and use of equivalence scale. In some cases, the robustness analysis is performed
only for a subset of the countries because of data availability. As summarized in Table 5, the
main picture is that the country ranking by wealth inequality is robust to the alternative
specifications.24.
To be specific, the country ranking is unaffected by adding number of children and
marital status to the set of controls for all countries (AG(1)). Moreover, extending the set
of controls to include occupation, and industry, and sex of household head (AG(2)) do not
alter the picture of inequality. The same holds true when we also control for immigration
status and region (AG(3)), and when using the subsample of couple households to control
for age and education of the spouse (AG(4)). Acknowledging the inherent arbitrariness in
the choice of equivalence scale, we use an alternative equivalence scale (AG(6)) and find
that the ranking is unchanged. On top of this, we make sure that the choice of economic
growth rate does not affect our results by applying alternative growth rates (AG(7)–AG(8)).
Finally, we check that using polynomials of continuous age variables instead of age-group
dummies does not change the country ranking (AG(9)).
However, when we restrict our sample to singles (AG(5)), the ranking changes somewhat.
A motivation for this specification check is that the common practice of using equivalence
scales to capture pooling of wealth and economics of scale within the household may be too
crude. However, as being single is potentially endogenous to individuals’ wealth holding,
24The robustness analysis undertaken is described in more detail in Appendix B
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we need to be cautious in interpreting these results. With this caveat in mind, we can
see that restricting the sample to singles alters the ranking of Finland from having the
most equal distribution to being more unequal than Italy. It is also evident that Sweden
and the United States change order in the country ranking when looking only at singles.
Furthermore, our results demonstrate that AG is generally higher within the sample of
singles compared with the population as a whole. There are several possible explanations.
On the one hand, negative marital sorting on wealth could contribute to lower inequality
for the full sample compared with the subsample of singles. On the other hand, the high
inequality within the sample of singles could simply reflect that this a very heterogeneous
group of people, making the comparison difficult both across and within age groups.
In line with the other results above, the time trends in inequality in Italy and the United
States are robust to the alternative specifications. However, the results change somewhat
when we examine the time trend in the subsample of singles (see Appendix B).
5 Concluding remarks
A strong relationship between age and wealth implies that inequality of wealth at a given
point in time is likely to exist even in a society where everyone is completely equal in all
respects other than age. It has therefore been argued that age adjustments of inequality
measures based on cross-sectional data are necessary.
This paper proposed a method to adjust for age effects in cross-sectional data, which
eliminates transitory inequality, but preserves inequality arising from other factors. Apply-
ing a cross-country comparable wealth database, we found smaller effects of age adjustment
than existing approaches. Interestingly, our new age-adjusted Gini coefficient provides a
wealth inequality ranking of countries that comes quite close to the ranking based on the
classical Gini coefficient, which disregards age effects. A possible interpretation is that age
adjustments are less important than previous studies have suggested, albeit this conclusion
may not necessarily hold true for other applications.
There are a number of other applications where life cycle effects matter. For exam-
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ple, theoretical models and empirical results suggest a strong relationship between age and
earnings. This raises several interesting questions. Is the substantial increase in earnings
inequality in developed countries over the last decades an artifact of the baby boomers grow-
ing older? Can reported divergence in global income inequality be explained by increased
differences in the age structure of rich and poor countries? Our age-adjusted inequality
measure can be used to investigate these questions.
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Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The triangle inequality theorem states that |x− y| ≥ |x| − |y|, and inequality holds
if and only if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i) x > 0 and y < 0
(ii) x < 0 and y > 0
(iii) x > y and y < 0
(iv) x < y and y > 0
Let x = (wi − wj) and y = (µi − µj). It follows that WG > PG if and only if one of
the above conditions holds for at least one pair of individuals i and j.
Without loss of generality (because of the symmetry of the conditions), let the age
groups be sorted by mean wealth such that µi ≥ µj. Let min(wi) denote minimum wealth
in the age group of individual i, and let max(wj) denote the maximum wealth in the age
group of individual j.
Assume that µi > µj, implying y > 0.
No overlap in age-group distributions: assume thatmin(wi) ≥ max(wj). Then,min(wi)−
µi < max(wj)−µj whenever wi 6= µi for at least one individual in the age-group of individ-
ual i or wj 6= µj for at least one individual in the age-group of individual j. In that case,
x < y and condition (iv) holds.
Overlap in age-group distributions: assume that min(wi) < max(wj). Then, x > 0 and
condition (ii) holds.
Hence, µi 6= µj for at least one pair of individuals and wi 6= µi or wj 6= µj for at least
one of these individuals are sufficient conditions for WG > PG.
Appendix B Robustness analysis
The results from the robustness analysis are summarized in Table 5 for the cross section
ranking and in Table 6 for the trend (Italy and the United States), which both display
Table 6: Wealth inequality ranking of countries according to AG by specification
Italy 2002 Italy 2004 USA 2000 USA 2003 USA 2006
AG 0.587 0.580 0.912 0.908 0.895
AG(1) 0.589 0.582 0.912 0.908 0.895
AG(2) 0.608 0.600 0.912 0.908 0.895
AG(3) 0.606 0.599 NA NA NA
AG(4) 0.568 0.577 0.921 0.918 0.905
AG(5) 0.687 0.645 0.983 0.966 1.094
AG(6) 0.592 0.580 0.913 0.910 0.897
AG(7) 0.582 0.577 0.912 0.908 0.895
AG(8) 0.593 0.584 0.912 0.908 0.895
AG(9) 0.589 0.582 0.912 0.908 0.894
Note: Data sources are national household wealth surveys included and harmonized in the LWS database.
Household weights are used to ensure nationally representative results. Country ranking is given in
parentheses.
AG: Baseline specification controlling for education.
AG(1): Estimation adding number of children and marital status as a control variables to baseline
specification.
AG(2): Estimation adding sex of household head, number of children, occupation, industry, and marital
status as control variables to baseline specification.
AG(3): Estimation adding number of children, occupation, industry, marital status, region, and immigra-
tion status as control variables to baseline specification.
AG(4): Estimation adding spouses’ education and age as control variables to baseline specification.
AG(5): Estimation based on the sub-sample of single households using baseline specification.
AG(6): Estimation based on the EU equivalence scaling using baseline specification.
AG(7): Estimation based on a growth rate of two percent using baseline specification.
AG(8): Estimation based on a growth rate of three percent using baseline specification.
AG(9): Estimation based on polynomials of continuous age variables using baseline specification.
measured AG for the different specifications. In line with the results on cross section ranking
of inequality, the time trends in inequality in Italy and the United States are robust to the
alternative specifications. However, the results change somewhat when we examine the
time trend in the subsamples. A detailed description of each of the nine robustness checks
and the estimation results are given in subsections below. As can be seen from Table 5,
AG changes the country ranking only when we estimate on the sub-sample of singles.
B.1 Controlling for number of children and marital status—AG(1)
The first robustness check (AG(1)) includes the number of children and marital status of
the household in the set of controls. As we can see from Table 7, wealth holdings either
decrease with the number of children in the household or we are unable to identify a
significant effect. We can also see that all included categories have larger wealth holdings
than single households with no children (which is the base category not included). We can
see from Table 5 that the country ranking is unaffected by adding the number of children
and marital status to the set of controls.
B.2 Controlling for number of children, marital status, occupa-
tion, industry, and sex of household head—AG(2)
Table 8 presents the regression results from the second robustness check (AG(2)), which
extends the set of controls with dummy variables for occupation, industry, sex of household
head, number of children, and marital status. For brevity, the coefficients for occupation
and industry are excluded from the table.25 Table 5 shows that this robustness check does
not alter the country-ranking of wealth inequality.
B.3 Controlling for number of children, occupation, industry,
marital status, region and immigrant status—AG(3)
Table 9 shows the regression results from the third robustness check (AG(3)), where we add
number of children, occupation, industry, marital status, region, and immigrant status to
the set of controls. This robustness check is only carried out for Germany, Italy, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom, as we lack information about these additional controls for the other
countries. For brevity, the estimated coefficients for occupation and industry are excluded
from the table. Table 5 shows that this robustness check does not alter the country-ranking
of wealth inequality.
B.4 Controlling for characteristics of the spouse—AG(4)
Table 10 shows the regression results from the fourth robustness check (AG(4)), studying
the sub-sample of households with a couple and it includes the age and education of the
25The dummy variables for some of the educational categories are dropped from the sample because of
perfect collinearity between education and occupation.
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Table 9: Children, occupation, industry, number of children, marital status, im-
migration status, region, and sex of household head added as control variables—
AG(3)
Germany 2001 Italy 2002 Italy 2004 Sweden 2002 UK 2000
Number of children -0.001 -0.018 -0.011 0.001 0.012
(0.000) (0.018) (0.020) (0.000) (0.008)
Female household head -0.005 0.009 -0.045 -0.001 -0.005
(0.001) (0.027) (0.028) (0.001) (0.006)
25-34 years -0.008 0.008 0.004 -0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.066) (0.079) (0.000) (0.007)
35-44 years -0.003 0.155 0.132 0.002 0.083
(0.001) (0.065) (0.080) (0.000) (0.009)
45-54 years 0.011 0.426 0.444 0.009 0.173
(0.001) (0.068) (0.081) (0.000) (0.009)
55-64 years 0.029 0.733 0.680 0.016 0.226
(0.001) (0.070) (0.088) (0.002) (0.036)
65-74 years 0.037 0.969 1.097 0.030 0.336
(0.001) (0.077) (0.098) (0.002) (0.021)
75 years and older 0.051 1.039 1.044 NA 0.325
(0.002) (0.105) (0.110) (NA) (0.024)
High school graduate 0.004 NA NA 0.003 0.093
(0.002) (NA) (NA) (0.001) (0.009)
Post secondary 0.009 NA -0.203 0.007 0.127
(0.002) (NA) (0.062) (0.001) (0.018)
University degree 0.024 0.133 NA 0.007 0.244
(0.002) (0.065) (NA) (0.002) (0.029)
Single parent 0.011 -0.003 0.053 0.001 0.029
(0.001) (0.075) (0.095) (0.001) (0.020)
Couple without children 0.012 0.034 0.003 0.004 0.046
(0.001) (0.040) (0.041) (0.001) (0.010)
Couple with children 0.015 0.098 0.058 0.004 0.007
(0.001) (0.041) (0.045) (0.001) (0.030)
Other 0.024 NA NA NA 0.018
(0.002) (NA) (NA) (NA) (0.017)
Constant 16.403 13.288 13.600 16.536 14.228
(0.005) (0.070) (0.111) (0.001) (0.105)
R-squared 0.081 0.356 0.334 0.010 0.116
Number of observations 97600 4075 4272 19654 6809
Note: Data sources are national household wealth surveys included and harmonized in
the LWS database. Household weights are used to ensure nationally representative results.
Reference categories: 24 years and younger, male household head, high school dropout, and
single without children. The coefficients for occupation, industry, immigration status, and
region are omitted for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
spouse. This robustness check is carried out for all countries except Canada, as we lack
information about the characteristics of spouses for this country. In this robustness check,
we have a multi-collinearity problem, as the characteristics of the head of the household
and the spouse are significantly correlated. However, most coefficients remain significant
when we include the age and education of the spouse. Table 5 shows that this robustness
check does not alter the country-ranking of wealth inequality.
B.5 Estimating on the sub-sample of singles—AG(5)
There are a couple of reasons for estimating our model on the sub-sample of singles. First,
it can be argued that the use of an equivalence scale is a crude way to capture pooling
of wealth and economics of scale within the household. Second, in the main specification,
we have followed common practice and used information about the head of the household
to determine the age groups. However, the age of the spouse may also be relevant for
determining the age or life cycle effects on household wealth holding. Table 11 presents
regression results from the fifth robustness check (AG(5)), where we estimate the model on
the sub-sample of singles. Table 5 shows a slight change in ranking for the estimation on
this subsample.
B.6 The EU equivalence scale—AG(6)
Acknowledging the inherent arbitrariness in the choice of equivalence scale we perform
another robustness check (AG(6)), where we use the EU equivalence scale instead of the
square root equivalence scale. Table 12 shows the corresponding regression results. As
demonstrated by Table 5, the country ranking by wealth inequality is robust to the choice
of equivalence scale.
B.7 Alternative growth rates—AG(7) and AG(8)
This paper tries to separate age effects from cohort effects by adjusting for economic growth.
In the main specification, we use an annual (real) growth rate of 2.5 percent. As a robustness
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check, we also experiment with annual growth rates of two percent (AG(7)) and three
percent (AG(8)). Tables 13 and 14 show the estimation results based on these alternative
assumptions about the economic growth rate. It is evident from Table 3 that the country
ranking by wealth inequality is robust to the choice of growth rate.
B.8 Polynomials of continuous age variables—AG(9)
The last robustness check performed in this paper replaces the age-group dummies with
polynomials of continuous age variables (AG(9)). Table 15 presents the estimation results
with continuous age variables. It is clear from Table 5 that the country ranking is robust,
whether we represent the age effects by age-group dummies or polynomials of continuous
age variables.
Appendix C Regressing education on age
This appendix presents for each country the results of regressing education on age. Table 16
shows the results for Canada, Table 17 for Germany, Table 18 for Italy, Table 19 for Sweden,
Table 20 for the United Kingdom, Table 21 for the United States, and Table 22 for Finland.
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Table 16: The effect of age on level of education – Canada
Canada 1999
< High school High school Post secondary University
25-34 years -0.101 -0.152 0.075 0.178
(0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016)
35-44 years -0.069 -0.146 0.086 0.128
(0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.015)
45-54 years -0.027 -0.175 0.030 0.172
(0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.015)
55-64 years 0.110 -0.190 -0.018 0.098
(0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.016)
65-74 years 0.272 -0.223 -0.088 0.039
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016)
75 years and older 0.367 -0.258 -0.123 0.014
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.016)
Constant 0.238 0.400 0.263 0.098
(0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.013)
R-squared 0.110 0.014 0.022 0.020
Number of observations 26035 26035 26035 26035
Note: Data sources are national household wealth surveys included and harmonized in the
LWS database. Household weights are used to ensure nationally representative results.
Reference category: 24 years and younger. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses.
Table 17: The effect of age on level of education – Germany
Germany 2001
< High school High school Post secondary University
25-34 years -0.023 -0.168 -0.062 0.253
(0.008) (0.022) (0.023) (0.009)
35-44 years -0.023 -0.174 -0.129 0.327
(0.008) (0.021) (0.022) (0.008)
45-54 years -0.023 -0.149 -0.159 0.331
(0.008) (0.021) (0.022) (0.008)
55-64 years -0.015 -0.118 -0.164 0.297
(0.008) (0.022) (0.022) (0.008)
65-74 years -0.017 -0.054 -0.149 0.220
(0.008) (0.022) (0.023) (0.009)
75 years and older -0.028 0.017 -0.135 0.146
(0.008) (0.023) (0.024) (0.009)
Constant 0.036 0.262 0.660 0.042
(0.008) (0.021) (0.021) (0.005)
R-squared 0.002 0.033 0.006 0.026
Number of observations 24731 24731 24731 24731
Note: Data sources are national household wealth surveys included and harmonized in the
LWS database. Household weights are used to ensure nationally representative results.
Reference category: 24 years and younger. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses.
T
ab
le
18
:
T
h
e
e
ff
e
ct
o
f
a
g
e
o
n
le
v
e
l
o
f
e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
–
It
a
ly
It
a
ly
2
0
0
2
It
a
ly
2
0
0
4
<
H
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
H
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
P
o
st
se
co
n
d
a
ry
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
<
H
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
H
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
P
o
st
se
co
n
d
a
ry
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
2
5
-3
4
y
ea
rs
-0
.0
5
8
-0
.0
6
2
0
.0
3
3
0
.0
8
7
0
.0
2
8
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
7
8
0
.0
6
3
(0
.0
5
1
)
(0
.0
5
4
)
(0
.0
5
4
)
(0
.0
3
4
)
(0
.0
4
4
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
3
5
-4
4
y
ea
rs
-0
.0
4
6
-0
.0
3
6
-0
.0
1
3
0
.0
9
4
0
.0
3
3
0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
9
7
0
.0
5
7
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
5
3
)
(0
.0
5
2
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
4
5
-5
4
y
ea
rs
0
.0
7
8
-0
.1
1
0
-0
.0
6
0
0
.0
9
2
0
.1
3
4
-0
.0
3
9
-0
.1
5
6
0
.0
6
1
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
5
3
)
(0
.0
5
2
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
5
5
-6
4
y
ea
rs
0
.2
9
9
-0
.1
7
5
-0
.1
8
5
0
.0
6
1
0
.3
2
8
-0
.1
0
4
-0
.2
5
0
0
.0
2
7
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
5
3
)
(0
.0
5
2
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
6
5
-7
4
0
.5
2
6
-0
.2
6
8
-0
.2
9
0
0
.0
3
2
0
.5
9
4
-0
.2
0
0
-0
.3
8
6
-0
.0
0
8
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
5
3
)
(0
.0
5
2
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
7
5
y
ea
rs
a
n
d
o
ld
er
0
.6
2
4
-0
.3
3
5
-0
.3
2
8
0
.0
3
9
0
.7
0
7
-0
.2
7
2
-0
.4
2
7
-0
.0
0
8
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
5
3
)
(0
.0
5
3
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
4
4
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
0
.1
1
4
0
.4
4
3
0
.4
2
9
0
.0
1
4
0
.0
2
3
0
.3
8
6
0
.5
3
4
0
.0
5
7
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
5
2
)
(0
.0
5
2
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
4
2
)
(0
.0
4
7
)
(0
.0
4
7
)
(0
.0
3
0
)
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.2
6
8
0
.0
5
0
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
0
9
0
.2
8
4
0
.0
4
5
0
.0
7
7
0
.0
1
1
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
3
3
8
6
1
3
3
8
6
1
3
3
8
6
1
3
3
8
6
1
3
2
4
0
1
3
2
4
0
1
3
2
4
0
1
3
2
4
0
N
ot
e:
D
at
a
so
u
rc
es
ar
e
n
at
io
n
al
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
w
ea
lt
h
su
rv
ey
s
in
cl
u
d
ed
an
d
h
ar
m
on
iz
ed
in
th
e
L
W
S
d
at
ab
as
e.
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
w
ei
gh
ts
ar
e
u
se
d
to
en
su
re
n
at
io
n
al
ly
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
re
su
lt
s.
R
ef
er
en
ce
ca
te
go
ry
:
24
ye
ar
s
an
d
yo
u
n
ge
r.
H
et
er
os
ke
d
as
ti
ci
ty
-r
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
Table 19: The effect of age on level of education – Sweden
Sweden 2002
< High school High school Post secondary University
25-34 years -0.057 -0.073 -0.042 0.179
(0.014) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014)
35-44 years -0.015 -0.086 -0.026 0.135
(0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013)
45-54 years 0.049 -0.142 -0.062 0.164
(0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013)
55-64 years 0.156 -0.186 -0.094 0.132
(0.015) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013)
65-74 years 0.304 -0.253 -0.112 0.060
(0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014)
Constant 0.157 0.599 0.122 0.108
(0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011)
R-squared 0.076 0.018 0.019 0.013
Number of observations 24640 24640 24640 24640
Note: Data sources are national household wealth surveys included and harmonized in the
LWS database. Household weights are used to ensure nationally representative results.
Reference category: 24 years and younger. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses.
Table 20: The effect of age on level of education – the United Kingdom
United Kingdom 2000
< High school High school Post secondary University
25-34 years -0.016 0.025 -0.025 0.020
(0.018) (0.029) (0.032) (0.009)
35-44 years 0.043 0.024 -0.088 0.024
(0.018) (0.028) (0.031) (0.009)
45-54 years 0.172 -0.023 -0.172 0.025
(0.020) (0.028) (0.032) (0.009)
55-64 years 0.244 -0.022 -0.220 0.001
(0.022) (0.029) (0.032) (0.008)
65-74 years 0.439 -0.032 -0.405 0.002
(0.024) (0.030) (0.032) (0.009)
75 years and older 0.479 -0.027 -0.440 -0.010
(0.025) (0.030) (0.032) (0.008)
Constant 0.083 0.237 0.660 0.017
(0.015) (0.026) (0.028) (0.007)
R-squared 0.157 0.003 0.089 0.006
Number of observations 6953 6953 6953 6953
Note: Data sources are national household wealth surveys included and harmonized in the
LWS database. Household weights are used to ensure nationally representative results.
Reference category: 24 years and younger. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 22: The effect of age on level of education – Finland
Finland 1998
< High school High school Post secondary University
25-34 years -0.007 -0.276 0.196 0.086
(0.026) (0.035) (0.027) (0.015)
35-44 years 0.060 -0.317 0.174 0.076
(0.026) (0.033) (0.025) (0.013)
45-54 years 0.187 -0.392 0.132 0.062
(0.027) (0.033) (0.024) (0.012)
55-64 years 0.379 -0.509 0.092 0.026
(0.030) (0.034) (0.025) (0.012)
65-74 years 0.583 -0.614 0.014 0.012
(0.032) (0.035) (0.025) (0.013)
75 years and older 0.654 -0.641 -0.013 -0.000
(0.033) (0.036) (0.025) (0.012)
Constant 0.138 0.751 0.089 0.022
(0.022) (0.029) (0.021) (0.010)
R-squared 0.222 0.112 0.033 0.015
Number of observations 6737 6737 6737 6737
Note: Data sources are national household wealth surveys included and harmonized in the
LWS database. Household weights are used to ensure nationally representative results.
Reference category: 24 years and younger. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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